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Abstract Issues of responsibility in the world of
nanotechnology are becoming explicit with the
emergence of a discourse on ‘responsible develop-
ment’ of nanoscience and nanotechnologies. Much
of this discourse centres on the ambivalences of
nanotechnology and of promising technology in
general. Actors must find means of dealing with
these ambivalences. Actors’ actions and responses
to ambivalence are shaped by their position and
context, along with strategic games they are
involved in, together with other actors. A number
of interviews were conducted with industrial actors
with the aim of uncovering their ethical stances
towards responsible development of nanotechnology.
The data shows that standard repertoires of justification
of nanotechnological development were used. Thus,
the industrial actors fell back on their position and
associated responsibilities. Such responses reinforce a
division of moral labour in which industrial actors and
scientists can focus on the progress of science and
technology, while other actors, such as NGOs, are
expected to take care of broader considerations, such
as ethical and social issues.
Keywords Ambivalences.Divisionofmorallabour.
Position andcontext.‘Responsibledevelopment’of
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Discourse on the responsible development of nano-
science and nanotechnologies starts with the promise
of nanoscience and nanotechnology but then centres
on ambivalences in nanotechnology, for example, the
notion that “size matters”. On the one hand, “size
matters” in terms of the interesting phenomena and
novel effects which occur at the nano-scale. On the
other hand, “size matters” with regard to the potential
toxicity of nanoparticles. Other ambivalences, such as
promises that may turn into hype, apply not only to
nanotechnology but to promising technology in
general. Such ambivalences generate and definitely
fuel discussion, as well as contestation, between
proponents and opponents of the promising technology.
These are particularly salient in nanotechnology and
deserve further consideration.
Ambivalences of Promising
A traditional individual-based ethics would say that one
should not exaggerate but this cannot capture the whole
story of ambivalence in promising technology. A
technology such as nanotechnology needs promises,
including some exaggeration, to persuade target
audiences. It is the only way to mobilise resources to
actually realise the promise. Thus, actors have to
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e-mail: c.shelleyegan@utwente.nlparticipate in the strategic game of promising (sometimes
beyond reason).
Current developments in the world of nanotech-
nology demonstrate the role of position and context
and strategic games in promising technology. There is
a back-and-forth pattern of ethical argumentation
between proponents and opponents of the technology.
The arguments put forward by the actors are
indicative of their view of what the ‘responsible
development’ of nanotechnology should involve.
Some stable distribution of responsibilities (and thus,
a division of moral labour) may evolve. This
distribution of responsibilities may well be justified
and productive but it is primarily the outcome of a
struggle, a larger and more distributed version of the
struggle that Latour illustrated with the program and
anti-program of the hotel manager and the hotel
guests in relation to the hotel key [2].
Such positioning and the patterns that are involved
have been analysed before; I will offer a brief overview
in the next section. What is new for nanotechnology is
that such discussions and positioning have become
pervasive and that actors have to be articulate about
them.
Industrial actors are interesting in this respect,
because they are closer to actual applications and their
repercussions than scientists. We initiated a discussion
around responsible development of nanotechnology
in interviews with industrial actors. This was part of
the ‘Ethics in the Real World’ workpackage in the
EU-funded DEEPEN (Deepening Ethical Engagement
and Participation in Emerging Nanotechnologies)
project.
1 The industrial actors struggled with
ambivalences in nanotechnology; their responses to
these ambivalences were linked with their position as
industrial actors and the particular contexts within
which they act. Interestingly, and indicative for the
new situation around nanotechnology, their interactions
withNGOsinfluencedhowtheydealtwithambivalence
in nanotechnology.
The repertoires that the industrial actors drew on
reflect an ‘enactor’ perspective; the promise of nano-
technology must be pushed and ethics is seen as a brake
onprogress.However,theycanbemorenuanced,asour
interview data show. By way of a preface, I offer two
vignettes demonstrating strategic use of promises. One
vignette describes the strategic considerations towards
hype followed by biotechnologists inthe Netherlands in
the 1980s, while the other recapitulates the use of
promises about embryo research by opponents of the
research.
Proponents of a technology are faced with strategic
considerations with regard to whether they want to
contribute to hype around a technology or be more
reasonable in referring to the promise of a technology;
these strategies can be combined with different resource
mobilisation strategies. Rip and Nederhof [5]o b s e r v e d
that these two strategies were pursued by scientific
researchers in the Netherlands in the 1980s, in the
move towards biotechnology-relevant research. Bio-
chemists and molecular biologists made strong claims
especially because they were more removed from
actual practices of biotechnology than microbiologists
and chemical engineers, who were more modest. As
biotechnology was not an essential component of their
ongoing research, biochemists and molecular biologists
were ‘re-labelling’ ([5], 258) their ongoing research, so
that they too could join the biotechnology band-wagon
and avail of policy funding opportunities.
The promises of proponents of a technology can be
strategically used by opponents to undermine their
credibility. Mulkay [3] examines some of the rhetorical
resources used by opponents and proponents of
embryo research during a parliamentary debate in the
UK House of Commons in 1990. Both rhetorics ‘look
into the future and focus on the expected outcomes of
scientific research’ ([3], 728). Proponents of the
research used the rhetoric of hope to make strong
claims about the promise of the research, even though
the details of the development were as yet unknown.
For opponents, the tangible achievements of embryo
research to date were judged to be negligible and the
rhetoric of fear was used to challenge opponents’
claims, transforming them into a ‘collection of
misleading exaggerations’ ([3], 730).
These vignettes demonstrate actors’ response to the
ambivalence of hype and, in turn, their response to the
opportunities of a promising technology (in the first
case) and the concerns evoked by a promising
technology (in the second case). To continue this
discussion, the ‘ethics of promising technology’ [10]
suggests that one should not exaggerate without
reason but also that there may well be reasons: ‘one
has to mobilize resources to be able to realize
(materialize) the promises, and has to do so in
1 See www.geography.dur.ac.uk/projects/deepen.
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([10], 18). Moreover, ‘one has to claim more than is
reasonable, in order to be able to realize what is
actually a reasonable claim’ ([10], 18). This ambiva-
lence is widely recognised in promising technology. It
leads to two different actor strategies: one can choose
to sustain the hype or be more modest in presenting the
promise of a technology. While there is an immediate
opportunistic argument to pursue the hype strategy,
there are two arguments against it. As a result of
inflated promises, research investment may be directed
into unfeasible areas of research, to the detriment of
other research communities that could have benefited
more from investment, resulting in wasted resources
and missed opportunities. The deontological argument
highlights the ethics of exaggeration [10].
There is actually a general pattern in the promises
and the responses to them. Sparrow [9] and Swierstra
and Rip [10] argue that proponents of nanotechnology
often try to have it both ways in arguments about the
nature and impact of nanotechnologies, describing
nanotechnologies as both revolutionary and evolu-
tionary, depending on the discourse surrounding
nanotechnologies at the time: ‘In arguments about
their nature and impact we are simultaneously
informed that these are revolutionary technologies
with the potential to profoundly change the world and
that they merely represent the extension of existing
technologies’ ([9], 57). This ambivalence is visible in
patterns of ethical argumentation about new and
emerging science and technology described by
Swierstra and Rip [10]. The pattern starts with
promises voiced by proponents, claiming major
changes, all for the good of mankind, that is, the
technology is ‘revolutionary’. In response, opponents
of the technology who are calling for a cautious
approach highlight the novelty of the new technology
in order to bring attention to the dearth of knowledge
about effects of the new technology. The proponents
then face a problem; they had initiated the discussion
by stressing the novelty of the technology in order to
attract allies and mobilise resources. They are now
forced to downplay the novelty of the emerging
technology and present it as nothing unusual; what
was once termed ‘revolutionary’ is now toned down
to ‘business as usual’ or ‘evolutionary’.
This downplaying of novelty by proponents of
the new technology is just one move in the strategic
game played between proponents and opponents.
When the capacity to continue with the development of
‘revolutionary’ nanotechnology is threatened by
opponents’concerns,theproponentsareforcedtopresent
nanotechnology as ‘evolutionary’ in order to assuage the
concerns and fears of opponents. Given the way in which
‘revolutionary’ or ‘evolutionary’ nanotechnology is
deployed according to the need to hype up or play down
nanotechnologyinresponse toopposingvoices, it is clear
that this ambivalence depends on the particular context in
which nanotechnology is discussed.
This form of context-dependence can also manifest
itself in the specific qualification of ‘revolutionary’ or
‘evolutionary’. In an interaction between a prominent
representative of industry and a leading NGO represen-
tativeata seminar onpolicy-makinginnanotechnology,
I observed how the notion of ‘revolutionary’ nanotech-
nology was given another qualification. The industry
representative began her presentation by saying that
nanotechnology should be seen as a revolution in
quality of life rather than as an industrial revolution.
This interpretation of ‘revolutionary’ differs from the
interpretation of ‘revolutionary’ nanotechnology as
‘the next Industrial Revolution’ which will profoundly
change the world for the better. In correspondence
following the meeting, the industry representative told
me that the message she wanted to convey was of the
great impact of nanotechnology rather than that of an
industrial revolution because of the specific view of
‘industrial revolution’, which is not altogether positive;
thus it seemed that the industry representative was
cognisant of the need to tailor the notion of ‘revolu-
tionary’ nanotechnology to suit the particular context.
In this context, the opposing discussant was an
important factor and the industry representative
demonstrated awareness of what kinds of argument
might appeal to or even ‘win over’ the NGO
representative. Interestingly, the industry representative
had mobilised an argument from ‘good life’ ethics to
argueforthecontinueddevelopmentofnanotechnology.
This argument is most often used by commentators and
criticalgroupswhowillsometimesdescribea‘goodlife’
and use this as a reference in discussions about a
promising technology; on the other hand, proponents of
a promising technology often push the promises and
fantastic possibilities of a new technology without
reflecting on what kind of ‘good life’ their technology
might deliver [10].
The NGO representative then gave a presentation
entitled ‘There should be a nanotech moratorium’
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(emphasis added) a major industrial revolution’.
In this interaction, it appears that the NGO
representative is also aware of the use of qualifying
‘revolutionary’ by conceptualising it in terms of
‘industrial revolution’.
2 His labelling of ‘revolutionary’
nanotechnology as a ‘major industrial revolution’
enabled him to use the negative connotation of
‘industrial revolution’ in a counter strategy to argue
for a moratorium on nanotechnology R&D. The
‘game’ of back - and - forth argumentation is visible
again.
Positions of Industrialists
These are general considerations. How do industrial
actors manage these ambivalences and tensions when
faced with strong claims about the promises of nano-
technology emanating from policy makers and being
taken up in society, as well as the emerging discourse
about responsible development of nanoscience and
nanotechnologies and possible restrictions on unfettered
development of nanotechnologies?
We mapped the ethical commitments and patterns of
moral argumentation of industrial actors whose company
had some involvement in nanotechnology. We inter-
viewedrespondentsfromcompaniesinvolvedinthethree
main domains in nanotechnology—micro/nanoelec-
tronics, materials and surfaces and bionanotechnology.
The respondents came from multinational companies
including a chemical company, two semiconductor
companies, a beverage and foodstuffs company and a
big conglomerate including a food company.
In some sectors, nanotechnology is an enabling
technology which delivers new materials and compo-
nents to help create better devices and systems which
provide desired functionalities. In other sectors,
nanotechnology just improves performance and
sometimes allows new functionalities (e.g. surfaces
that repel dirt) but the constitutional effects derive
from the system and how it is embedded and used.
Still, nanotechnology can lead to major differences
because certain thresholds may be passed. For
example, when RFID (Radio Frequency Identification
Devices) becomes cheaper and smaller, thanks to
nanotechnology, and thus more widely usable and
easier to implant, all products can be traced individually
and an “Internet of Things” becomes possible, leading
toa viewofthe implantable andthus“readable” human.
All this is yet to come but it is being discussed already
and may lead to measures and arrangements [7].
For new materials, it is indicative that chemical firms
havedevelopednanotechnologycodesofconduct.They
have a good record (cf. Responsible Care program) and
think they can meet the credibility pressures. For other
domains under the umbrella of nanotechnology, the
situation ismore complex. Micro-electronics firms have
other priorities than responsible development of nano-
technology. In bionanotechnology, companies’ first
concern is to survive.
The industrial actors we interviewed did not switch
from ‘revolutionary’ to ‘evolutionary’ but the other way
around, from ‘evolutionary’ to ‘revolutionary’.W e
began the interviews by asking the respondents about
their company’s involvement in nanotechnology and
their stance towards responsible innovation in nanotech-
nology.
3 They described nanotechnology as an ‘evolu-
tion’ in their development and responsible innovation in
nanotechnology as a normal part of their Corporate
Social Responsibility, thus ‘business as usual’.
This description of development in nanotechnology
as ‘business as usual’ was evident in the bemused
response of a respondent from a chemical company
when asked how his company came to be involved in
nanotechnology. He replied ‘We are a chemical
company, so why the question?’ He went on to describe
nanotechnologyasa‘naturalstepindevelopment’when
nanotechnologiesare definedas‘th ene xtst eptoco nt ro l
materials at an ever smaller scale.’ In another version of
‘business as usual’, the respondent from the beverage
and foodstuffs company explained that there is already
nanotechnology—which is not new—in the food
chain.
Nanotechnology was viewed as evolutionary by
respondents from both semiconductor companies.
One respondent explained that nanotechnology
simply represents a solution to a technical problem.
2 The use of ‘industrial revolution’ by both proponent and
opponent of nanotechnology is an example of ‘argumentative
association’ [4] as cited after Burchell [1]; arguments can be
made more or less convincing by associating them, positively
or negatively, with other notions, historical practices and so on.
3 We asked the respondents whether their company’s stance
was part of their overall Corporate Social Responsibility or
additional to corporate responsibility; we wanted to find out if
the industrial actors considered nanotechnology to be ‘ethically
special’.
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includes more and more nanotechnology in its
miniaturisation drive. Thus, for this sector, nanotech-
nology is not revolutionary; it is the continuation of
microtechnology.
The industrialists’ use of the ‘nothing unusual’
argument is general but is articulated differently. The
responseoftherespondentsfromthechemicalcompany
and the beverage and foodstuffs company highlights
that there is nothing yet at stake for the companies in
terms of having to deal with specific nanotechnology-
related issues such as ethical, environmental and health
and safety issues. Their response emphasised
downplaying the promise of nanotechnology; these
sectors of industry are aware that nanotechnology
evokes certain fears and concerns so they are careful
to stress that nanotechnology is nothing new and thus
not cause for concern. The semiconductor sector, on the
other hand, does not see these concerns as relevant for
them, if they are aware of them at all.
When we asked the respondents for their view on
calls for a ban on nanotechnology development
4
nanotechnology became ‘revolutionary’—with the
exception of the respondents from the semiconductor
companies—and could contribute to efforts towards
climate protection or to the fight against cancer. This
was then linked to an ethical argument against a
moratorium on nanotechnology development.
5
I offer a few quotes to support this diagnosis:
‘Nanotechnology would be good for the
environment, for energy use, etc. and if you
look at nanomedicine—what they talk about—
nobody can be against it... if you design a
medicine in such a way that it finds the right
place to be released in the body without any
additional side-effect’ (respondent from the
chemical company).
The benefits of nanotechnology in the push
towards climate protection were noted by the
respondent from a big conglomerate including a
food company who felt that a moratorium on
nanotechnology R&D would slow down the devel-
opment of solar cells ‘...when everybody outside is
saying, the single biggest threat to our human
species is climate change...’.H ea d d e d‘[The] same
applies for preservation of foods in hunger stricken
areas’. This respondent continued by making claims
of ‘ethically responsible’ action and said that he
considered a moratorium on commercial develop-
ment of nanotechnology to be itself possibly
‘ethically questionable.’
In the last quotes, the ‘nothing unusual’ argument
is inverted; the proponents of the new technology
stress the novelty of nanotechnology when defending
continuation of its development. This differs from the
pattern of moral argumentation described by Swierstra
and Rip. In this case proponents of nanotechnology
adopt the strategies of opponents—to highlight the
novelty of nanotechnology—but for a different cause
than that pushed by opponents. Here the novelty
argument or revolutionary argument is used in order
to defend development of nanotechnology. Thus the
respondents use the revolutionary argument when
there is something at stake for them as proponents of
nanotechnology; in this case it is their right to
continue to work on nanotechnology development.
There was a clear shift in focus from the technical or
the performance aspect—when referring to the
evolutionary nature of nanotechnology—to the social
problem/solution dichotomy—when pronouncing on
the revolutionary potential of nanotechnology. When
respondents referred to social issues such as medical
treatments and climate change, which are both high
on the agenda in discussions in the social sphere,
nanotechnology became revolutionary. Positioning
nanotechnology as a potential solution to social
problems facilitated the call for ongoing development
of nanotechnology.
The industrial actors have a prudent approach to
the promise of nanotechnology. They realise that it is
in their interest to present nanotechnology as ‘business
as usual’ or ‘evolutionary’ in order to render nanotech-
nology familiar and therefore harmless. On the other
hand, they offer the promise of ‘revolutionary’ nano-
technologyasanargumenttoletthemcontinue.Suchan
argumentassumesthattheiraudiencewillwantprogress
(through nanotechnology) and so will be receptive to
their claim. NGOs and civil society organisations may,
or may not, go along with this. An example is the
Friends of the Earth report on agricultural and food
4 In 2003, the ETC Group, a non-governmental environmental
organisation, called for a moratorium on the commercial
production of new nanomaterials.
5 Rip [6] argues that proponents of a technology often invoke
ethical arguments about their mandate to work towards progress
and failure to harness the potential of a new technology is seen
as unethical.
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6 while FoE wants improvement of
agriculture, the nano route will prejudice precision
agriculture as an alternative to the biological/ecological
route favoured by FoE.
A Division of Moral Labour
The ethical arguments of the industrial actors referred
to their notion of progress through the development
of nanotechnology. Indeed their response to the
ambivalence of the nature and impact of nanotechnology
was predicated on their need to be allowed to continue
with the development of nanotechnology. However, they
did not make this kind of argument upfront. This
argument emerged when they made claims of ‘ethically
responsible’ action, for instance, the development of
organic solar cells to be deployed in the fight against
climatechange.Thusresponsibilitywasexplicitlyframed
in terms of the development of nanotechnology to meet
societal challenges. This then allowed them to turn the
stance of NGOs that industry is ethically questionable in
its pursuit of nanotechnology back onto the NGOs; if
NGOs stop development in nanotechnology, then they
are the ones who are unethical.
The ethical arguments which the industrial actors
used to justify development in nanotechnology reflect
standard repertoires in which scenarios of promise are
pushed and ethics is viewed as a brake on progress.
These standard repertoires build on the present
division of moral labour. Division of moral labour
refers to a division of obligations and commitments,
as well as to notions regarding who is eligible to be
praised or blamed [8]. The present division of moral
labour creates a space in which scientists and other
technology developers, such as industrial actors, can
focus on the progress of science and technology,
while other actors (government agencies, NGOs) are
expected to look after other considerations, including
ethical and social ones.
Indeed the industrial actors’ view of the role of
NGOs in the responsible development of nanotech-
nology referred to a division of moral labour. The
industrial actors felt that NGOs had the right to ask
critical questions and indeed, that somebody should
ask questions on behalf of the public. This was
reflected in one respondent’s view that NGOs are
‘entitled to their position’ even when they call for a
moratorium on nanotechnology development.
Another respondent felt that NGOs’ concern about
nanotechnology is
‘...a very good thing, in the sense that there are
groups of people who watch the developments
and look critically at them, ask questions to
make sure that everybody is keen on the balance
between opportunities and the potential risks.
Well, that’s the impression I have. Also, I
believe that even the groups that are sort of
aware and ask critical questions, my personal
impression is that they are also looking for the
balance about what is really the issue and only
the ones who are very political will make a firm
statement like there should be a ban before we
know enough’.
Here the respondent introduces a distinction
between ‘good’ NGOs and ‘bad’ NGOs. This is an
enlightened view; there are also industrial actors who
are furious over the activities of NGOs. In our
interviews, we heard respondents accuse NGOs of
being agitators, failing to act in good faith, using
misleading information to further their cause and
painting different nanotechnologies with the same
brush.
In Conclusion
A division of moral labour is effective when it is accepted
and implemented, that is, when it is ‘solid’.H o w e v e r ,i n
changing circumstances (which might include changing
values, e.g. about precaution or about participation),
where responsibilities may have to be redefined, the
solidity of the division of labour will become a hindrance
rather than a help. It has to be opened up or “melted”
down to allow space for new configurations [8]. While
the industrial actors’ views about NGOs reinforced this
division of labour, new configurations in the world of
nanotechnology, such as the collaboration between the
chemical manufacturing company DuPont and the non-
profit group Environmental Defense, suggest that there
is already a move towards redefining responsibilities in
the world of nanotechnology.
In 2005, DuPont and Environmental Defense (who
could be viewed as adversarial stakeholders) formed a
partnership to work together to produce a nano risk
6 See: http://action.foe.org/content.jsp?content_KEY=3965
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7 aimed at evaluating and addressing
potential environmental, health and safety risks of
nanomaterials across the entire life cycle of the
materials. DuPont evaluated the framework—deemed
appropriate by both organisations—using three case
studies and published the results in early 2007. Both
organisations have issued a call for feedback on the
framework and have encouraged companies to adopt
the framework. Interestingly, there was a response
from a ‘civil society labour coalition’,
8 which issued a
statement condemning what they called the ‘public
relations campaign’ of DuPont and Environmental
Defense. The corporate partnership between DuPont and
Environmental Defense may set a precedent for a new
kind of interaction between industry and NGOs. On the
other hand, the strong response from the civil-society
labour coalition reasserted the traditional boundaries and
division of moral labour which exist between industry
and civil society organisations. At this stage, it is
impossible to decide whether the civil-society labour
coalition’s reaction is conservative in the face of ongoing
overall changes, or an indication that such changes are
not occurring, and the DuPont-Environmental Defense
collaboration is a passing occurrence.
This caseshows thatoperationalisation of ‘responsible
development’ can, and will, be contested because
changes in division of moral labour are about politics
just as much as they are about ethics. This is visible in my
interview data as well, even while there is no action
involved. The ambivalences of nanotechnology, and of
promising technologies more generally, are not just an
intellectual challenge; the evolving strategic games that
are played are for real, even if the discourse of
responsible development may start as a new ‘language
game’.
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